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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KEITH L. KNIGHT, d.b.a. Knight Realty
Company,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

~

f
\

No. 8623

ROSS H. CHAMBERLAIN,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a ruling of the
District Court of the Third Judicial District, sustaining the
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, made at the
close of the plaintiff's evidence. The motion to dismiss was
"for reasons indicated in the answer. Our Code, Section 25-5-4,
subdivision 5, provides as follows: * * * 'In the following
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement
or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing, subscribed
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by the party to be charged therewith: every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real
estate for compensation.' "

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the transcript of testimony is devoted to the
testimony of the plaintiff himself. Mr. Knight testified that
he is a realtor "engaged in the pursuit of buying, selling, leasing and optioning for others" and has been engaged in that
business for 15 years, and a licensed broker for 12 years (Tr.
11 and 12). He had specialized in the matter of land development and subdividing (Tr. 12). He met the defendant through
a business associate and proceeded that very day to take an
airplane ride over and around Salt Lake County to inspect
various prospective areas for subdivision development on a
large scale (Tr. 13). The defendant specified that he must
have a minimum of 500 acres to be optioned and preferably
1000 acres (Tr. 14). The defendant "wanted to know about
water, and sewage, and as I recall, the matter of arterial highways, his relative position to areas of employment, the convenience of getting to it, the school district arrangement, all
of those miscellaneous and salient details beyond the point
of location." (Tr. 16). After the airplane trip the defendant
showed the plaintiff his method of operation, including his
control sheets and financing schedules (Tr. 17).
After an explanation that he felt he could bring this type
of operation to Salt Lake City and be successful with it, he
said, "Keith, I'll be glad to pay you for your services in attempting to package up * * * " (interrupted by objection).
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"Well, Mr. Chamberlain said that he was desirous of my going
ahead and lining up some options." (Tr. 18}. "Mr. Chamberlain stated to me, he said, 'Keith, as we progress on this program', or words to this effect, 'I will be glad to pay you for
your services.' It was upon the strength and integrity of that
statement-(interrupted by objection" (Tr. 19}.
A further trip by motor car was taken the next day to inspect the various areas seen from the air during which "I felt
enthused about the possibilities of packaging up the type of
acreage that Mr. Chamberlain wanted because he showed
~! very definite interest in these areas. I told him it was customary on the part of realtors that in the event we could get
our options exercised, that we would look to the sellers for
the payment of our commissions. I told Mr. Chamberlain that
he would have no obligation for payment of my services, if
I could exercise the option.'' And Mr. Chamberlain promised
to send to the plaintiff the form of option he would like to
use (Hr. 22).
The type of option m use by the defendant involved
''around $25.00 down and $25.00 per acre year year rental
value" (Tr. 24). There was never any money made available
by the defendant for deposits on options (Tr. 25).
Between August 26, 1955,and November 14, 1955, when
the plaintiff saw the defendant for the second time, the plaintiff
obtained the maps and identified the areas he would be working
on (Tr. 20). He also went to the Chamber of Commerce and
assembled the data that was required, including pamphlets,
trade data and other pertinent details (Tr. 30}. The option
form used by the defendant come about August 31st and is
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marked Exhibit 2 (Tr. 30). The plaintiff then got ownership
plats and proceeded to make personal contacts to determine
whether the various owners would sell under option and
discuss the form of the option with the various owners (Tr.
32). He made no offers supported by consideration. "That
was part of the difficulty of the program" and his effort was
to obtain signatures of the owners, to be submitted to Mr.
Chamberlain when he should next come to town, and actually
paid no money, not even the $1.00 nominal consideration recited (Tr. 33). He was unable to get anyone interested in
signing the defendant's option form and had no authority
to modify it (Tr. 34).
A group of owners was represented by Mr. Elias Day,
an attorney, who told the plaintiff that "this option will never
work. We will have to talk a more positive arrangement on
the purchase of the contract." To which plaintiff replied that
he woud like Mr. Day to get "the best type of deal and send
it back so I can submit it to my client" (Tr. 36).
Mr. Chamberlain came to Salt Lake again on November
14th (Tr. 43) and the parties spent considerable time together
during that visit, including inspection of all of the areas
where the plaintiff had been working (Tr. 45-46).
The plaintiff informed the defendant that the activity
of the Boeing people had had a tremendous impact on interpretation of values in the county and was making plaintiff's
task more difficult, and told the defendant that it would take
$150,000.00 and $25,000.00 a year to handle a 1000 acre
tract (Tr. 47). And with reference to another parcel of 1000
acres the defendant said: "By all means we should definitely
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option that." And as the defendant was about to leave, he said,
"Knight, you go back over those areas. You bring me down
some signed options, or earnest money receipts. I will spend
$15,000.00 cash and $25,000.00 a year with you. And then you
bring them to Sacramento with you and I want you to come
down and look over our type of operations, so you can get a
feel of how we will go into Salt Lake and as rapidly as you
can put that together, you let me know and you fly down
and bring them with you." But no cash was made available
for option money (Tr. 48) and there was no discussion as
to the form upon which the plaintiff would endeavor to obtain
options ( T r. 49) .
Thereupon the plaintiff proceeded "to accumulate that
area" in the Dimple Dell vicinity, near Draper, Utah, and
attempted to use the Intermountain Development Co. as the
source of a master option, which would be supported by suboptions in favor of the Intermountain Development Co. (Tr.
72) on the assumption that $150,000.00 down would be
available. In another area he was unable to get an option or
any other oral indication within the terms of Mr. Chamberlain's statement "they would sell but they wanted a cash
consideration" (Tr. 75). He attempted to obtain a commitment from the Winn family, which wanted $2,000 per acre
"they weren't willing to enter into an option agreement whose
performance was subject to the potential buyer's performance.
They wanted a firm contract."
On November 29th, plaintiff went to Sacramento to contact
the defendant and took with him such options as he had been
able to obtain, such as Exhibit 7 (Tr. 77-78). By that time
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it appeared that the Boeing option was not being exercised
and this was discussed in passing ( T r. 78-79) . The plaintiff
exhibited the documents he had obtaioed with the signatures
and after a conference out of the office the defendant returned,
threw them on the desk and said they weren't acceptable
(Tr. 82).
Prior to leaving, on November 29, the plaintiff said to the
defendant: "Are you through with my services?" and the
defendant replied: "Why don't you go back home and see
what you can do about the Boeing program and see how you
can line up 1000 acres on that portion of the tract that Boeing
did not exercise" (Tr. 83).
The options referred to $10.00 consideration but nothing
was paid (Tr. 87). If the options contained in Exhibit 7 had
been exercised, the defendant would not have been required
to pay the plaintiff any compensation, as he would have been
paid by the sellers (Tr. 85). These commissions would have
been based on written agreements (Tr. 85).
It was the plaintiff's understanding that he was to be paid
for his services whether or not he was successful in completing
the defendant's program (Tr. 134 and Tr. 138, 139).
Mr. F. Orrin Woodbury testified in behalf of the plaintiff
that he was experienced in commercial and industrial developments in Salt Lake City (Tr. 54), that he had a great deal of
respect for the plaintiff in both his aggressiveness and ability
to get a job done and intuition about doing the job or finding
the job to do (Tr. 55). It is customary in Salt Lake City and
under the Salt Lake Real Estate Board to obtain options for

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would-be purchasers and to obtain commission based on the
price paid if the options are taken up, and upon agreed compensation if they aren't taken up (Tr. 56). Rule XVI (a)
and (b) of Exhibit 5 indicate the expression of the Salt Lake
Real Estate Board on this matter. Unless a prospective purchaser deposits funds with which to pay for options, he refuses
to work for such purchaser (Tr. 63).
The defendant called Joseph Lacey as his witness, out
of order, which testimony was not transcribed in view of the
granting of the motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence
(Tr. 111).
Exhibit 2 was sent to the plaintiff by the defendant as
being the type of option agreement the defendant wanted to
use in Utah (Tr. 24, 25, 30). It is entitled an "option agreement" and calls for a down payment of $25.00 per acre, and
permits keeping the option alive for five years by paying an
additional $25.00 per acre each year.
Exhibit 3 contains some of the correspondence between
the parties. The letter dated September 2, 195 5 includes this
paragraph:
"This is to advise that I am in the process of running
down the owners of the parcels you indicated a greater
interest in. As of this writing, I have not been as successful as I might have been, but feel, within the next
week or ten days, I'll be able to give you something
specific to pass upon."
A letter of September 26, 195 5, from the defendant to
the plaintiff includes this paragraph:
"In the meantime I think that we would be willing
to enter into an option agreement on any of the prop-

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

erties you describe in your letter. If you are able to
get any of them put together, do so, and if Mr. McCullough concurs, we will execute them when we are
in Salt Lake City."
The letter of October 12, 1955, from the plaintiff to the
defendant includes the following:
"Not having heard from you since your letter of
September 26th that indiicated you would be willing
to enter into some of the options on the land that I have
tentatively committed, and in which letter you suggested
you might come into Salt Lake, meeting Mr. McCullough here, this is to advise that I have been awaiting
your arrival to go over the numbers of parcels of lands
that have been assembled for your consideration. * * *
All of our parcels are definitely available, however,
on that approach if we can commit the cash purchase of
the first 40 acres in each instance. * * * I feel that I
probably have rendered about as much of a service as
I can contemplate at the present moment, until such
time as I hear from you, preferably your dropping
into Salt Lake at your convenience."
Exhibit 6 is a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant and
concludes with this sentence:
"I am eager to complete my services to you to the
best of my ability.''
Exhibit 7 is entitled a "Contract and Option", but an
examination of it indicates that it is not an option, but a contract of sale, reciting consideration of $10.00 and calling for
definite commitments of both parties to the purchase and sale
through periodic installments. These documents were signed
only by the seller and were taken by the plaintiff to the defendant in Sacramento, where the defendant stated: "these aren't
acceptable" (Tr. 82).
10
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Exhibit 8 consists of further correspondence between the
parties and includes a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant
dated December 9, 195 5, which includes the two following
paragraphs:
"This is to advise you that I am very appreciative
for your check in the amount of $90.50. I have taken
the liberty of depositing hte check, even though this
amount was in excess $13.61 of my actual cost of the
round-trip air plane ticket to Sacramento. However, I
am crediting this difference to Mr. Chamberlain's account with me for other expenses and services rendered
in his employment of my services here in Salt Lake
Valley.
I have hesitated billing Mr. Chamberlain, in light
of the fact that in the event we are able to transact
any business with him on which I would be paid a selling commission, that would automatically pay for my
services by virtue of the commissions that would be
involved in any transactions consummated with him."
The trial court made its ruling, granting the motion to
dismiss, on the ground that Knight had been employed to
obtain options for the purchase of real estate and that these
must be in writing, as held by the California court (in Pacific
South West Development Corp. vs. Western Pacific Railroad
Co., 321 Pac. 2d 825) (Tr. 152). The court apparently relied
also in part on the concurring opinion of Justice Wade in
Andersen vs. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 Pac. 2d 725, wherein
Justice Wade is supposed to reason that anyone who assists or
contributes to dealing in or the purchase or sale of real estate,
must have a broker's license and, likewise, must see that the
record of his emplayment is in writing (Tr. 150).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
Whether this decision is sound, rnay be considered and
tested from consideration of three propositions:
1. Employment of services to be paid for in the event there

is no sale need not be in writing.
2. Employment of a broker to obtain offers to sell real

estate is not within the statute of frauds.
3. Employment to obtain opinions to buy lands is not
within the statute of frauds. (This appears to be the question
as the trial court saw the case.)

ARGUMENT
1. Employment of services to be paid for in the event there
iJ no sale need not be in writing.

The employment contract here was m the alternative,
depending on whether a sale was consummated. Mr. Knight
testified that Mr. Chamberlain engaged his services to attempt
to package lands in Salt Lake Valley and said he would be
glad to pay for his services as they progressed on the program
(Tr. 18, 19). On the next day plaintiff advised the defendant
that if the options could be exercised and a transaction consummated, the plaintiff would look to the sellers of the land
for his commissions and would not hold the defendant in
that event (Tr. 22). And this agreement was plainly stated
in the letter of December 9, 1955, contained in Exhibit 8.
It may, therefore, be fairly said that the agreement between
the parties was that the defendant would employ the plaintiff
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to work on the assembling of tracts of land in Salt Lake County,
and would pay for his services in so doing, but it was agreed
by the plaintiff, that in the event any lands were purchased
by the defendant, the plaintiff's commission would be derived
from the sellers of the land and not from the defendant. This
then is not an agreement for compensation for the purchase
or sale of real estate, but an agreement that no compensation
need be paid by the defendant in the event there is a purchase
or sale of real estate. The latter contingency was covered by
written agreements with the owners of lands (Tr. 85) as the
statute of frauds contemplates.
The appellant concedes that an action in quantum meruit
is not available to a broker who is employed to purchase or
sell real estate, where he fails to put the agreement in writing,
as in Baugh vs. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 355. Appellant
has no quarrel whatever with that decision.
But where the employment is to render services connected
with land and not for the purchase or sale of land, a recovery
for the reasonable value of services can be had, even though
there is no memorandum in writing.
In Andersen vs. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725,
729, the plaintiff brought an action against a real estate broker
pursuant to an oral agreement that the plaintiff could have
one-third of the defendant's commissions on properties listed
by the defendant with the help of the plaintiff. The court disposed of the defendant's claim that the statute of frauds barred
recovery by holding: "the contention of respondent that plaintiff cannot recover because his agreement was oral, is untenable.
The contract was one of employment and not involving any
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right or interest in land. See Johnson vs. Allan, Utah 1945,
158 P. 2d 134. The proposition that a contract for fee or commission may be recovered by agent from broker, though not in
wrting, is upheld in Arbuckle vs. Clifford F. Reed, 118 Cal.
App. 272, 4 P. 2d 978, (and other cases)."
A case of value on this point is Clark vs. Opp, 156 Ore.
197, 66 P. 2d 1179. At page 1180 the court thus stated the
question:
"The propriety of the court's instructions upon the
subjects of agency and ratification is also challenged.
In paragraph IV of his complaint, plaintiff alleges:
"That on or about the 1st day of May, 1931, it was
agreed by and between the plaintiff and the defendants
that if the plaintiff would go upon said mining property, tunnel, timber and develop the said property and
expose and sample the ore bodies thereon so that the
same could be advantageously exhibited to one John
M. Price, a prospective lessee, and would show said
property to said prospective lessee, the defendants
would pay unto the plaintiff ten per cent of any and
all royalties which they might receive from any lease
of asid premises made by the defendants with said
John M. Price, until the sum of $10,000.00 had been
paid plaintiff."
The court easily disposed of this question under the Statute
of Frauds as follows:
"The distinction between a contract for the services
of a real estate broker or agent and the contract alleged
in plaintiff's complaint, as herein above set out, is
recognized in the following cases: Bates v. OregonAmerican Lumber Company (D. C.) 285 F. 666; Hall
v. Rankin, 22 Ariz. 13, 193 P. 756; Wilson v. Morton,
85 Cal. 598, 24 P. 784; Sherman v. Clear View Orchard Co., 74 Or. 240, 145 P. 264."
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Another such case is Hall v. Rankin, 22 Ariz. 13, 193 P.
756 and 757. There the oral agreement was as follows:
'I have been trying to sell the Henrietta mine to the
Big Ledge people, but the mine must stand the inspection of Mr. Shockey, their engineer. I have had a
'racket' with him and I canont get them to go out and
look over the property. You know these people, and
I want you to get their engineer on the ground, and
if I get $150,000 for it I will pay you $25,000 for your
services, and if I sell it for less I will pay you very
liberally, and in any event I will pay you for your trouble
and expense."
The court thus reasoned this portion of that case:
"We construe the contract as one of employment or
agency rather than one to "sell real estate, mines or
other property, for compensation or commission",
Statute of Frauds, paragraph 3272, subdiv. 7, Rev. Stat.
Ariz. 1913, as amended by chapter 135, Session Laws
Ariz. 1919. We would not be justified in straining the
terms of the contract so as to bring it within the statute
of frauds and thus do a great injustice to the plaintiff.
It is a familiar canon of construction to construe a
contract, if it may consistently be done, to be effective,
rtaher than ineffective. 'Where a * * * contract as a
whole is susceptible of two meanings, one of which
will uphold the contract or render it valid and the
other of which will destroy it or render it invalid, the
former will be adopted so as to uphold the contract.'
13 C.J. 539; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 6 Sup.
Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940. The statute of frauds, of course,
is binding upon us and must be obeyed and enforced
whenever a case falls within its provisions, but it was
remarked by Chief Justice Buchanan in delivering the
opinion in Lamborn v. Watson, 6 Har. & J. (Md.)
255, 14 Am. Dec. 275, where the defense under the
statute was successfully relied on, for the protection
t;)
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of a dishonest defendant, that the statute "probably
generates as many frauds as it prevents." The subdivision of the statute referred to was clearly designed
to protect owners of real estate against unfounded
claims of brokers (Gorham v. Heiman, 90 Cal. 346, 27
Pac. 289) and contemplates a transaction between
parties contracting with each other as principals."
This case also involves the interesting point that the commission being sued for was not commission or compensation
within the statute, but the reasonable value of services. The
court held: "the suit is not one to recover 'compensation' or
'commission' for the sale of real estate, but to recover the
reasonable value of the services of the plaintiff as the agent
of the defendant.'' The Arizona statute apparently related to
either "compensation" or "commission."
The Utah Statute of Frauds relates only to employment
of agents "for compensation." In line with the Arizona case
this word could reasonably be limited to a fixed percentage
of a sale price and not applicable at all to an action for reasonable value of services.
In Kramer vs. Schmidt, 62 Mont. 568, 206 P. 620 and
621, there was an oral agreement between the plaintiff and
defendant relating to transfer or assignment of an option to
buy land at a specified price. With reference to option, the
case will be later considered, but on the question of compensation for services, as distinguished from a commission,
the Montana court said:
"The agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant did not amount to an employment of the former as a broker or agent to buy land or an interest in
alnd, which by the statute is required to be in writing,
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but to an engagement by him to perform a service
which could be lawfully made by oral contract."
Under the evidence in this case, it is obvious that if the
appellant had been asked by an owner of land whether he was
authorized to purchase or sell real estate in behalf of the
respondent, Mr. Knight could have replied only that he was
engaged to attempt to package parcels of land so that the
respondent could consider the advisability of a purchase. The
appellant's testimony and the written documents speak plainly
of the employment of his services and not of his authority to
purchase for the respondent and hold him for a commission.
2. Employment of a broker to obtain offers to sell real

estate is not within the statute of frauds.

As this point is stated, it can hardly be questioned that it
is not within the statute of frauds. In Woolley vs. Wycoff, 2
Utah 2d 329, 273 P. 2d 181, the court held that where a broker
obtained a lease of real estate, the contract does not fall within
the statute of frauds, and in so holding said: "It certainly
must be conceded that the first blush impression is that mere
rental of property should not be considered as a 'purchase
or sale of real estate' ". And so here the first blush impression
is that a contract employing a broker merely to obtain offers
to sell land is not employment for the purchase or sale of real
estate.
This point is stated separately from point 3, for the reason
that the evidence in the case indicates that appellant was not
actually employed to obtain options on land, because he had
no money with which to pay for an option, and that all that
he actually did was obtain offers from the owners of land to
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sell to the respondent. Exhibit 2, which was supplied by the
respondent, is a form of option which requires $25.00 per
acre to obtain the option. Since the tracts involved and considered by the respondent were from 500 to 1000 acres (Tr.
14), it would have taken from $12,500.00 to $25,000.00 to
enable appellant to proceed in the respondent's behalf. The
appellant testified that he never, at any time, had any money
whatever with which to tie up any land (Tr. 25, 33, 48 and 84).
It is, therefore, plain that the appellant was not employed
to obtain options on land, but to determine whether land could
be purchased, either on an option basis or on an outright purchase basis, such as Exhibit 7 constituted.
It is true that the appellant obtained agreements in writing
from the owners of lands, that in the event of sale they would
pay a real estate commission to the appellant (Tr. 85) but
that is not the agreement in action here. Respondent agreed to
pay appellant for his services in working on these various
properties, and at no time either empowered, enabled, or
authorized the appellant to purchase a single acre for the
respondent.

This point also has significance in that it was suggested
by the trial judge that employment which looks to, or aids,
or assists in the purchasing or sale of real estate, comes within
the spirit of the statute of frauds because of the case of
Andersen vs. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725. This
case will be considered more fully under point 3, and is
equally applicable to point 2.
In Johnson vs. Allen, supra, at page 139 of 158 P. 2d,
the court considered the terms of a contract employing a broker
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to sell real estate which must be contained in the written memorandum. The court said:
"The terms of the employment, the amount of compensation, and the length of time the listing was to
run, were all certain. It is not disputed that the lands
sold were the lands listed in the contract. * * * The
contract was not void under the statute of frauds.
* * * And though it employed plaintiff to procure
a purchaser for lands located in Idaho, the sale did
for that reason not have to be consummated in Idaho.
Under its terms plaintiff was authorized to sell the
land to anyone who was willing to pay the agreed
purchase price. Under its terms the contract could have
been performed anywhere."
The failure to give the appellant any authority, is additional evidence that the appellant was not employed to sell
real estate, but only to obtain offers to be submitted to the
respondent.
In Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 77 Utah 176, 292 P. 915,
918, the plaintiff, a real estate broker, was awarded a judgment
for real estate broker's commission, which was reversed on
appeal because there was ~o allegation or proof of an express
contract of employment. This court held:

"If it had been alleged that the appellants had employed respondent to procure from the Campbells a
binding agreement for the exchange of their respective properties, it might well follow that the broker
had earned his commission when he had procured such
a contract, even though the properties, for some reason,
are not actually exchanged. Jennings vs. Jordan, 31
Cal. App. 335, 160 Pac. 576. But that is not this case.
Here there is no allegation of any express contract of
employment, either to sell or exchange, or to bring about
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the execution of a binding agreement for exchange or
properties. The present case is controlled by Case v.
Ralph, supra, so we have no alternative but to reverse
the judgment. * * * ''
Thus it appears that specific employment either to purchase or sell or to bind the principal, is a necessary part of the
employment of a broker in order to comply with the statute·
of frauds. Conversely, if the employment does not authorize
the purchase or sale and does not authorize the agent to bind
the principal, there is no employment for the purchase or
sale of real estate and the statute of frauds is not applicable
at all.
Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640, 643, was also
an action by a broker to recover a commission in which he
relied upon a written agreement and the case was reversed
because the written agreement was not sufficiently specific.
At page 642 the court stated:
"The courts generally hold, that under such a statute
a real estate broker or agent cannot recover commission
for services rendered in either selling or procuring a
purchaser for real property, unless it appeals: 1. That
there is an express contract or agreement of authority
in which the terms and conditions of his employment,
if any, and the amount of his commission, etc., are
stated; 2. That such contract be in writing; * * * ."
And at page 643: "It is very clear, therefore, that
up to this point no express contract authorizing the
defendant to sell or to procure a purchaser is alleged
in the complaint. While it is true that an express agreement to pay commission is alleged, yet that is clearly
insufficient to constitute a cause of action in view of
the provisions of our statute. What the statute requires
is that the employment of authority of the agent to
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sell or procure a purchaser, must be evidenced by an
express agreement in writing. * * * All those statements may be true, precisely as by the demurrer they
must be conceded to be, and yet there is not an intimation, even that what is alleged was done by virtue of
an express contract, authorizing plaintiff to procure a
purchaser.''
Again we point out that appellant was not authorized to
purchase any land for the respondent, he was given no authority
to bind the responent in any particular, he was given no money
with which to make a down payment, and he was authorized,
only, to solicit owners of land to determine their willingness
to sell, and if possible, to get written offers to be submitted
to the respondent, either in Salt Lake City or in Sacramento,
California. It is not the failure to get the agreement in writing
that is important, but the fact that there was no express agreement of authority, and no means whereby the appellant was
empowered to act for the respondent, as his broker or agent,
in making a purchase. This just was not employment for the
purchase or sale of real estate. If a sale had been made, the
appellant would have looked elsewhere for his commission,
but his action here is against the respondent for that which
alone he was empowered to do, namely, attempt to package
c; parcel of property so that it could be submitted to the respondent for his investigation and approval.
In Pacific South West Development Corp. vs. Western
Pacific Railroad Co. (Cal. 1956), 301 P. 2d 825, 829 to 830,
where the court held that employment of a broker to obtain an
option is within the statute of frauds, the court inquired also
into the sufficiency of the contract which will support an action
for commission. The court said:
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''The chief element required to be shown in writing,
is the fact of employment of the broker to act for the
principal in the transaction. * * * The above letter
merely states the terms and conditions on which de~endant was willing to negotiate for the property, but
1t does not show employment of plaintiff to act for
defendant. * * * Furthermore, the last sentence of the
letter indicates that various details yet remained for
consideration in completing any transaction. * * * But
such writing by Nelson and subsequent meetings with
Stratton in attempting to work out a suitable arrangement for purchase of the Lenfest property cannot satisfy
the statutory requirement of a writing, 'subscribed by
the party to be charged, or his agent.' "
And, likewise, in O'Neil vs. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62
P. 2d 672 and 674, where the court held that an agreement
employing a broker to obtain an option is not employment
to buy or sell an interest in land, the court went on to consider
the essential terms of such an employment contract. The court
stated:
"The contract which was entered into by the defendant, was an agreement to sell and purchase real estate,
but such an agreement does not amount to a sale of
real estate. It is an executory agreement which would
become a sale of real estate when fully performed, that
is, when all of the payments have been made. Wright
Land & Investment Co. vs. Even, 57 Montana 1, 186
Pac. 681. That particular contract had to be in writing,
in order to be valid (subdiv. 5, sec. 7519); and if
plaintiff had purported to sign such an agreement on
behalf of the defendant, her authority by the terms
of the sectoin was required to be in writing; but the
defendant did not act in the execution of this agreement through his representative, but did execute it in
person. * * * The contract sued on was not required
to be in writing by the statute pleaded."
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3. Employment to obtain options to buy land is not within
the statute of frauds.
There is no evidence whatever in this case that the appellant was employed to make an outright purchase of land in
behalf of the respondent. There was conversation between the
parties as to the obtaining of options and the documents which
were used (Exhibits 2 and 7) both were denominated options.
Even if this court should hold that the appellant was employed
by the respondent to obtain options to buy land, the judgment
of the district court should be reversed.
In O'Neill vs. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 P. 2d 672, the
plaintiff brought action to recover compensation for services
rendered by her in inducing one or more of certain persons to
enter into a contract to purchase mining property from the
defendant. Action was on express contract and also quantum
meruit. Recovery was had on an express contract. The agreement was that the plaintiff was to secure with certain persons
either a lease and option or a lease or option that was acceptable to the defendant with certain terms being specified, and
the evidence established that an agreement was entered into
by the defendant and one or more of such persons, on the terms
specified. The Montana Supreme Court held:
"The question is thus presented: Is a contract employing a broker or agent to induce others to enter
into an option or lease, or a lease and option, required
by the statute to be in writing?
"It will be noted that the statute relates to the purchase or sale of real estate. It was definitely decided by
this court in the case of Kramer vs. Schmidt, 62 Mont.
568, 206 Pac. 620, that a contract to secure an option
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need not be in writing. Since the holder of an option
acquires nothing but a personal privilege to purchase,
which does not ripen into an interest in the land until
he ~hooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the
optlon, and complies with the terms on which he purchased it, an agreement employing a broker to procure
or negotiate an option does not amount to an employment of a broker or agent to buy or sell an interest
in land."
The court then considered whether a lease was an interest
in real estate and concluded that it was not and held:
"The contract sued on was not required to be in writing by the statute pleaded."
The question as to an option was squarely raised in
Kramer vs. Schmidt, 62 Mont. 568, 206 P. 620. In that case
one Bain had executed and delivered to one Awberry an option
contract for sale of land at a specified price. 'Knowing of this,
the defendant orally agreed with the plaintiff that if the plaintiff
would procure the assignment of the option contract to the
defendant, so as to give the defendant the right to purchase
the land under the option, he would pay the plaintiff a commission of one dollar per acre, or 5% of the entire purchase
price. The plaintiff induced Awberry to assign the option to
defendant and the defendant subsequently purchased the land,
but refused to pay the commission of $3,600.00. The defendant
raised the defense of the statute of frauds, which requires
that a contract employing a broker to purchase or sell real
estate must be in writing. The court squarely held that an
option to buy real estate is to be distinguished from the purchase or sale of real estate and that the statute of frauds is
not applicable. It thus reasoned its decision:
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"Counsel insists that, since it appears from the evidence that the agreement by which plaintiff was employed by defendant was not embodied in a writing
signed by the latter, it came within the provision of
the statute of frauds and was invalid. This contention
proceeds upon the assumption that the plaintiff was
employed as a broker or agent to purchase real estate
on a commission. The evidence does not justify this
assumption. It discloses that the contract gave to Awberry a mere option to purchase the land within a
specified time. Counsel falls into error in failing to distinguish between a contract of purchase and sale, and
one granting a mere option to buy. In the early case
of Ide vs. Leiser, 10 Montana 5, 24 Pac. 695, 24 American State Reporter 17, Mr. Justice DeWitt defined an
option as follows:' * * * An Option * * * is neither
a sale, nor an agreement to sell. It is simpy a contract
by which the owner of property (real estate being
the species we are now discussing) agrees with another
person that he shall have the right to buy his property
at a fixed price, within a time certain. He does not
sell his land, he does not then agree to sell it; but he
does then sell something, viz., the right or privilege
to buy at the election or option of the other party.
The second party gets in praesenti, not land, or an
agreement that he shall have land, but he does get
something of value, i.e., the right to call for and receive
land, if he elects. The owner parts with his right to
sell his land (except to the second party) for a limited
period. The second party receives this right, or rather,
from his point of view, he receives the right to elect
to buy." (p. 621).
Pacific Southwest Development Corp. vs. Western Pacific
Railroad Co., 301 P. 2d 825, was an action upon an alleged
contract for payment of a commission and is against appellant.
The court found that the agreement was not established by the
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evidence and could have rested its decision on that ground; but
it went further and determined that even if the plaintiff had
established its agreement, it could not have prevailed because
the agreement to obtain the option was not in writing. Negotiations by the plaintiff at $2500.00 per acre broke down
and the defendant then obtained directly from the owner an
option to purchase the land at $2,750.00 per acre and this
option was subsequently reduced to writing and then exercised
by the defendant. A controversy arose as to whether the plaintiff
was entitled to a half commission or a full commission and
plaintiff brought the action for the full 5% commission.
The court observed that: "In California an option to purchase real property has been held to come within the statute
of frauds and so must be in writing."
The court then finds that the term real estate as used in
the California Statute is the common law definition of real
property and excludes estates for years.
The court at page 829 then states that California decisions
have already held that the phrase "to sell or purchase" includes
"to aid or assist in the purchase or sale" of real estate, and "to
hold otherwise would open the door to the assertion of unfounded claims by brokers and others on the pretense of oral
employment in real estate transactions, relative to options, and
so frustrate the purpose of the statute."
Thus there are four basic premises for the decision of the
California Court:
A. An option to purchase real property must be in writing
in California·
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?:

B. Real estate real property refers to a free hold interest
in land and includes options.
C. Aiding or assisting in the purchase or sale of real estate
is included within the statute of frauds' phrase "to sell or purchase."

,.

D. It is important to avoid fraudulent claims.
Given these premises, and given also the fact that in this
case the plaintiff sued only for its full commission, and did not
allege any contract or services spent in bringing the parties
together or in furthering the interests of the would-be buyer,
the conclusion of the California court would not be persuasive
in Utah without examining those premises.
Let us consider, separately, the four premises which were
held established in California and which led to the conclusion
that employment to obtain an option is within the statute of
frauds.
a.An option to purchase real property must be in writing
in California. We have previously cited the Montana cases
which hold clearly that an option is not an interest in land and
that the employment of a real estate broker to purchase or sell
an option is not within the statute of frauds.

The Pacific South West Development Corporation case
says:
"In California, an option to purchase real property
has been held to come within the statute of frauds,
and so must be in writing. Bovo vs. Abrahamson, 100
Cal. App. 373, 383, 280 Pac. 191. The property of
this holding was recognized in Wilson vs. Bailey, 8
Cal. 2d 416, 65 Pac. 2d 770, 772, where the enforcement
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of an oral extension of a written option to repurchase
certain real property was in question."
It should be noted that this was a four to three decision
and that the disseating justices adopted the opinion of Mr.
Justice Fourt in the District Court of Appeals in this case,
reported at 293 P. 2d 800, including the holding of the lower
court that an option is personal and not real property.
Bovo vs· Abrahamson, supra, was a decision of the District
Court of Appeal. It involved an action to compel a purchase
of property in accordance with provisions of a trust deed executed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that defendant
was trustee for the plaintiff and plaintiff had the right to redeem the property. The court found that the only agreement
was that plaintiff could repurchase the property within a period
of 18 months from the date, and that this agreement was without consideration and had long since expired before the commencement of the action. The court held:
"That the agreement to convey was without consideration, was oral, and constituted a mere option to
purchase, and that the cause of action, if any ever
existed, was barred by subdivisions one and five, sections 16 and 24, of the Civil Code, and by subdivisions
1 and 5 of Section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and by Sections 318, 320, 323 and 363 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and was also barred by
laches." (p. 193).
It, therefore, appears that the holding that an option must
be in writing was not necessary to the disposition of this case,
although it was one of the grounds upon which the decision
was placed. Subdivision 1 of these sections provides that an
agreement that by its term is not to be performed within a
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year from the making thereof, must be in writing. And section
318, 320, 323 and 363 are limitation of action sections relating
to real property and possession thereof.
Wilson vs. Bailey, supra, is not a holding that an option to
purchase the real estate must be in writing. In that case there
was an option in writing an an oral extension was given under
such circumstances as to constitute an equitable estoppel against
claiming that the option was void. The court assumed that
the extension would otherwise have had to be in writing and
the court also held at 77 4 that the plaintiff had a clear right
to redeem the property as a deed given merely as security, in
which event there would have been no problem in the foreclosure.
Thus, neither of the cases relied on was persuasive.
The District Court of Appeals decision in the Pacific South
West Development case ( 29 3 P. 2d 800, 801), which was
adopted by the three dissenting Justices, was as follows:
··An option to purchase real property is a contract
containing an irrevocable and continuing offer to sell
at a specified price and a specified time. It conveys no
interest in land to the optionee, but vests in him only
a right in personam to buy at his election. Hence, an
option contract relating to the sale of land is not a
sale of porperty, but of a right to purchase. Hicks vs.
Christeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716, 164 P. 395; Warner
Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2nd 766, 772, 192
P. 2d 949, 3 A.L.R. 2d 691; Seeburg v. El Royale
Corp., 54 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 128 P. 2d 362; Kritt v.
Athens Hills Development Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d
642, 646, 241 P. 2d 606. It follows that an option
contract not being a contract for the purchase or sale
of real estate, a contract employing a broker to obtain
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the option does not fall within the provisions of Section 1624, subdivision 5, of the Civil Code, or Section
1973, subdivision 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
Hicks vs· Christeson, supra, was an action for a commission
brought by a real estate broker against the owner of land on
the theory that the plaintiff had found a purchaser ready, able,
and willing to buy. The plaintiff had, in fact, obtained a written
option for the sale of the land from the defendant, and the
question was whether he had found a buyer for the land under
the option. The case stands for the proposition that a contract
for the sale and purchase of property must be in writing and
the plaintiff failed because he could not show the written
agreement of the would-be purchaser to take up the option. But
the court does say in that decision:
"The agreement, which is the fountain head of any
authority possessed by plaintiff, gave him the right
to contract for sale. An option is by no means a sale
of property, but is the sale of a right to purchase ( quoting other California cases.) "
In Warner Brothers Pictures vs. Brodel, supra, the court
held that the giving of an option for personal services constituted, in effect, a contract to perform or render services,
as an actor or actress. The court reasoned that the option constituted a continuing and irrevocable offer which could be
accepted by the optionee within its terms and thereby bind the
optionor, and that, therefore, provision of the statute against
disaffirmance was satisfied as being a "contract to perform or
render services·'. The court quoted the above language from
Hicks vs. Christeson and said:
"An option contract relating to the sale of land is,
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therefore, 'by no means a sale of property, but is a sale
of a right to purchase.' "
and quoted approvingly from Shaugnessy vs. Eidsmo, 222 Minn.
141, 23 N.W. 2d, 362, 363, 166 ALR 435:

" * * * A contract conferring an option to purchase
is * * * an irrevocable and continuing offer to sell, and
conveys no interest in land to the optionee, but vests
in him only a right in personam to buy at his election."
Seeburg vs. El Royale Corp., supra, was an action by
plaintiff to recover $5,000.00 paid for an option to purchase
an apartment house on the theory that the option had been
rescinded and made nugatory· The court again stated that an
option is not a sale of property but only of a right to purchase
and that it is a right acquired by contract to accept or reject
:· present offer within its terms.
"On acceptance the option becomes the contract of
sale, binding on both parties. * * * This does not mean,
however, that a new contract is in fact made by and
at the time of the acceptance. The contract has already
been made, as far as the optioner is concerned, but
it is subject to conditions which are removed by the
acceptance.''
The case does not purport to decide whether an option
falls within any provisions of the statute of frauds.
Kritt vs. Athens Hill Development Co., supra, is a square
decision that the obtaining of an option was not the making of
a sale within the meaning of the contract by brokers to obtain
<J commission on the sale of lots. The case does not involve
the statute of frauds, but only the question of when a broker
is entitled to his commission under a contract for payment of
commission upon sale of a lot. The option contract took a
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deposit and provided for forfeiture of all but $50.00 in the
event the option was not taken up.
It, therefore, appears that the law in California on options
under the statute of frauds was quite uncertain prior to the
Pacific South West decision and that that decision being four
to three invites careful scrutiny of the matters involved, including the California precedents, before acceptance by this
court.

b. Real estate or real property refers to a freehold interest
in land and (presumably) includes options.
The California court cited two earlier cases: Dabney v.
Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 6-7, 53 P. 2d 962, 103 ALR 822, and
Marks V· Walter G. McCarty Corp., 33 Cal. 2d 814, 819, 205
P. 2d 1025. Dabney v. Edwards simply holds that sale of oil
and gas leases is not the sale of real estate and a contract employing a broker to sell them need not be in writing, and
Marks v. Waletr G. McCarty Corp. holds that employing a
broker to purchase or sell real estate is within the statute of
frauds. The court cites no holding that an option is an interest
in land, and the court itself does not so state.
The California law appears to be contrary and to be that
an option is not an interest in land, and the Pacific South West
Development case must be rested on the ground that taking
an option is aiding or assisting in the sale.
In Warner Brothers Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766,
772, 192 P. 2d 949, 3 ALR 2d 691, 696, the court says an
option is not an interest in land.
The question whether an option falls within subdivision
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5 of the statute of frauds (UCA 1953 25-5-4) seems pretty
well settled by the case of Woolley vs. Wycoff, 2 Utah 2d 329,
273 p. 2d 181. In that case a real estate broker was employed,
orally, to procure a tenant on a ten year lease for a certain
warehouse. The plaintiff procured the tenant and Wycoff then
failed to complete his purchase of the property and therefore,
of necessity, was unable to enter into the lease. The plaintiff's
action was for a commission of the negotiated lease. The court
said:
"It certanly must be conceded that the first blush
impression is that mere rental of property should not
be considered as a 'purchase or sale of real estate'. This
is in accord with the common law principle that a
lease was personal property, and under modern statutes
it is generally held that the term 'real estate' does not
cover leases or rental agreements." (p. 182).
The defendant there urged that section 68-3-12 UCA 1853
dealing with construction of statutes, uses a different phrase
as to real estate and that this should be the measure of interpretation of the term "real estate" in the statute of frauds.
Subsection 10 of the section is:
"The terms 'land', 'real estate' and 'real property',
include land, tenements, hereditaments, water rights,
possessory rights and claims."
The court then considered at considerable length how the
statute of frauds language should be interpreted and rejected
the suggestion of this statutory aid and the possibility that the
lease was a possessory right and then concluded with this
language:
"However, even if we should concur with the defendant in making the doubtful assumption that a rental
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agreement is "real estate" on the ground that it is a
"possessory right", we are still met with the clear langu~ge of section 25-5-4(5} upon which the defendant
rehes. It declares void only agreements to ' * * * Purchase or sell real estate * * * '. A sale is certainly
something fundamentally very different from rental
o.f real property. The defendant did not employ plaintiff to procure a purchaser, but a lessee. Therefore,. the
transaction did not involve a contract authorizing
plaintiff to 'purchase or sell'.
"Although it may be that there is a good reason why
the legislature should have included agreements for
rental of property in the statute requiring such agreements to be in writing, as there is for sale, they did
not do so. They announced the policy; we interpret it.
For us to so interpret the statute that the words 'purchase or sell' are equivalent to 'rental', is inconsistent
with the manifest intent * * * ' expressed by the statute
and would amount to extending its coverage by judicial
legislation.''
And the court held that the contract employing a broker to
procure a leassee for real property was not within the statute
of frauds.
It thus appears that this court would use the definition of
section 68-3-12, if it were consistent with the language of the
statute of frauds. Nothing in the definition of real estate suggests that an option should be considered real estate, and it
would seem to follow, almost a fortiori, that an option is not
real estate within our statute of frauds.
c. Aiding or assisting in the purchase or sale of real estate,
is included within the Statute of Frauds' phrase: rrto sell or
purchase."
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The California case of Pacific South West Development
Corp. cites two California decisions in support of this holding.
These were Hooper v. Mayfield, 251 P. 2d 330, and Duckworth
vs. Schumacher, 27 p. 2d 919.
In Hooper v. Mayfield action was brought by a broker
to recover full commission on a sale of real estate. He had
conversations with the owners of the real estate and with a
prospective purchaser, and there was some conversation with the
purchaser about splitting a commission; but such purchaser
later dealt directly with the defendant and completed the purchase. The plaintiff attempted to show that he was employed
as amiddle-man and not as a broker and, hence, was not under
the statute of frauds. The court held that there was no proof
of employment as a middle-man and, therefore, rejected the
distinction between a middle-man and the agent of either buyer
or seller, on the facts of the case. The decision quoted from
Duckworth vs. Schumacher without any indication that the
cases were analogous.
Duckworth vs. Schumacher holds that employment for the
purpose of aiding or assisting in the sale of real estate is
within the statute of frauds. In that case:
"According to the complaint, the plaintiff was to
assist and aid the defendant in laying out for subdivision and subdividing for sale certain lands of the
defendant and to act as defendant's general sales manager in charge of the advertising of said subdivision,
and devising ways and means of promoting the sale
of said tract and superintending the sale thereof at
a stated salary per week, until the employment should
be terminated, and alleging certain payments made
thereon."
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From this the court concluded: "The employment had to
do with the sale of real estate." And at page 921 the court
said, in distinguishing earlier cases:
"In the case at bar, the plain intendments of the
parties to the contract were that the plaintiff was to aid
and assist in preparing a certain tract of land belonging
to the defendant for sale, by laying the same out for
subdivision and subdividing it; to act as sales manager;
to promote the sales by a plan of campaign of advertising; and to superintend the sale thereof. * * * Such
employment, therefore, had for its sole object and
purpose the sale of the real property, and such an employment is within the inhibition of section 1624 of
the Civil Code. To hold otherwise would give rise to
a practice of ingenious forms, without substance in
fact, and thus avoid the very salutary rule of law as
declared in section 1624 of the Civil Code, and open
the door to fraud, long closed by said statute, and would,
in effect, abrogate such statute of frauds."
These cases do not suggest at all that anything which is
done by a real estate broker calculated to aid or assist in making
a purchase or a sale comes within the statute of frauds. The
cases hold and mean that a real estate broker cannot call himself something else, such as a middle-man or a sales manager,
when, in fact, his duties are to act as agent for the sale or
purchase of real estate, and still claim that he is not within
the statute of frauds relating to purchase or sale of real estate.
This is made plain by the case of Owen v. National Container
Corp· of California, 251 P. 2d 765, decided after both of the
cases relied on under this portion of the decision in Pacific
Southwest Development Corp. and not disturbed or distinguished by the Pacific Southwest case. The Owen case was an
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action for the usual five percent commission, based upon the
cost of the building for services connected with finding the
location and assisting in the planning of the building. The
lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the
ground that the contract alleged violated the statute of frauds.
On appeal the court held that the complaint stated a cause
of action for a valid oral agreement and that the proof would
have to determine whether there was an agreement for special
services or an agreement incident to the purchase of real estate.
The allegations of the complaint were that plaintiff worked
during a period of three years to assemble information for the
defendant as to a suitable factory site, sending information
concerning a number of properties which were eventually found
unsuitable. Plaintiff also submitted information concerning the
site actually purchased and concerning the plans, specifications,
and estimates for a factory building to be erected on the site.
At page 768 the court held:
"A valid oral agreement could be made for the
special services alleged, consisting of the surveys made,
the furnishing of plans, specifications and estimates,
and the negotiations carried on for the construction
of a building by Central Manufacturing District."
And at page 769, concluded:
"We may say, however, in conclusion, that if the
court should find that the services alleged were merely
incidental to plaintiff's efforts to bring about a sale of
real property to defendant, and that there was no
express agreement of defendant to pay for the same,
plaintiff cannot prevail in this action, either upon contract or in quantum meruit." (Emphasis supplied.)
Andersen vs. Johnson, supra, 160 P. 2d 725, was an action
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against a real estate broker for a one-third commission for
services rendered in obtaining listings and helping the defendant make sales. The defendant stood on a general demurrer
to the complaint, contending that the plaintiff was acting as
a real estate salesman without a license and could not maintain
the action, and also because the agreement for compensation
was void as within the statute of frauds, requiring employment of a broker to be in writing. Most of the court's opinion
is an analysis of the sections of the statute regulating the real
estate brokers and salesmen, and defining as a broker one
who buys or sells real estate for another or who "assists or
directs in the procuring of prospects, or otherwise assists in
transactions 'calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing
or renting of any real estate.' "
The court held that the work of the plaintiff in assisting
in the sale of real estate did not constitute him a real estate
broker, and as to the statute of frauds held:
"The contention of respondent that plaintiff cannot
recover because his agreement was oral, is untenable.
The contract was one of enmployment and not involving any rights or interest in land. See Johnson vs.
Allen, Utah 1945, 158 P. 2d 134."
It thus appears from the California decisions as well as

from the Utah case, that simply aiding or assisting in the purchase or sale of real estate does not place the activities or
the employment contract within the statute of frauds; the real
test is whether there is a bona fide and valid agreement to
do something other than purchase or sell real estate, for which
the parties bargained and for which the plaintiff brought
action.
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d. It is impot'tant to avoid fraudulent claims·

The Pacific Southwest case cites no authorities to support
this observation, but states: "To hold otherwise would open
the door to the assertion of unfounded claims by brokers and
others on the pretense of oral employment in real estate transactions relative to options, and so frustrate the purpose of the
statute."

If plaintiff were here suing for a real estate commission
on the theory that he had found lands suitable to defendant's
directions, which defendant had capriciously refused to purchase, the above language would be very apt. Defendant did
not employ plaintiff to purchase real estate and the evidence
of plaintiff was that, were sales to be consummated, the plaintiff
would look to the owner for his compensation, and would
claim nothing from the defendant. Defendant was a stranger
to plaintiff and came here as a big time building contractor
from California, who was interested in a very large development in Salt Lake County at the time the rumors concerning
the building of a Boeing plant here were rife. The defendant
offered to pay plaintiff for his services if he would get busy
and package up a parcel or several parcels for him. But he
gave plaintiff no authority to buy or tie up any land, and no
money upon which to operate or obtain options. Plaintiff simply
took the defendant at his word and spent a large amount of
time attempting to put attractive acreage together for the
defendant, and in the hope of realizing a substantial commission from the sellers, in the event the sales should be consummated.
The witness, Orin Woodbury, testified that the usual
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practice is to work for such a prospect and obtain payment on
a time basis if no deal is consummated, and that this is the
rule of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board; but that he, personally,
would not undertake such work for any prospect who made
no option money available.
Was the plaintiff too credulous, too trusting, too willing
to accept a substantial business man at his word? Mr. Woodbury was of the opinion that unless option money is put up,
there is no guarantee of good faith, and perhaps the plaintiff
should not have worked for the defendant. But he did proceed
to work diligently, made many reports by letter and by telephone to the defendant, in an honest endeavor to satisfy the
defendant and to package a parcel which would suit his requirements. He now asks the court to require the defendant
to live up to his promise to pay for plaintiff's services, and as
the court observed, the plaintiff is a reliable broker and the
compensation requested appears to be reasonable (Tr. 152).
We have attempted to analyze the Pacific Southwest case
and the authorities upon which it rests rather carefully, for
the reason that the trial court relied primarily, if not solely,
on that case· It is based, in part, upon law peculiar to California
and was an effort to go beyond the required scope of the case,
in order to settle conflicting and confusing decisions in the state.
It found a lack of employment to purchase or sell real estate
and did not need to go any further in reaching a decision.
It was a suit for a commission on the sale of real estate, and
was based on the theory of employment to obtain an option
with authority so to do. In all of these respects it is distinguishable from the case at bar, is contrary to the indicated
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Utah decisions on what is an interest in real estate, and whether
an option is the purchase or sale of real estate and should
not be followed by this court. Perhaps the Pacific Southwest
case has been given more attention than it deserved.
Many other authorities have considered the question of
whether an option must be in writing to comply with the
statute of frauds. Some of these decisions are controlled by
the language of the statute and some have statutes similar
to the Utah statute.
Richanbach vs. Ruby, 127 Ore. 612, 271 P. 600, 61 ALR
1441, p. 1447, is a square holding that an option to purchase
land is not an interest in land and need not be in writing
within the meaning of the statute of frauds. An annotation
following the case at page 1454 states that only two cases
raise the question square! y, one being the Richanbach case and
the other being Granger Real Estate Exchange vs. Anderson
(Texas Civil Appeals) 145 S. w. 262, which reached a con•
trary holding. In the Texas case the real estate broker sued
for his commission on the sale of land, alleging that he had
found a buyer who was ready, able, and willing to buy. The
case turned on whether or not the owner had given the plaintiff's prospect an oral option for two days within which to
decide whether he would pay the interest rate. The court held
that this option was void, both because it was without consideration and because it was not in writing and fell under
that provision of the statute of frauds requiring that a "contract for the sale of real estate must be in writing.''
A Minnesota case, decided in 1946, lines up squarely behind Richanbach vs. Ruby, supra. Shaughnessy, et al, vs.
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Eidsmo, et al, 23 N. W. 2d 362, 365. The court there held
that an oral agreement to lease premises with an option to
buy was specifically enforceable, holding:
"This option, prior to execution or acceptance, did
not of itself contribute anything to bring the agreement
under the statute of frauds. In the first place, the
contract conferring an option to purchase, is nothing
more than an irrevocable and continuing offer to sell,
and conveys no interest in land to the optionee, but
vests in him only a right in personam to buy at his
election. At best it is but an irrevocable right or privilege of purchase and does not come within Minnesota
statute 1941, section 513.04."
The court upheld an order, giving specific performance to
the plaintiff of the option to purchase real estate at the expiration of the lease.
In McGuirk vs. Ward, (Vermont 1947), 55 Atl. 2d 610,
the court considered whether an option to purchase land was
within the Vermont statute of frauds, requiring to be in
writing "a contract for the sale of lands or an interest in or
concerning them.'' The court considered the cases for and
against holding that an option is an interest in land, including
the following citation from 55 Am. Jur. p. 492, Section 27:
"An option to purchase real property may be defined
as a contract by which an owner of real property agrees
with another person that the latter shall have the privilege of buying the property at a specified price within
a specified time, or within a reasonable time in the
future, and which imposes no obligation to purchase
upon the person to whom it is given. Until the holder
or owner of an option for the purchase of property
exercises it, he has nothing but a mere right to acquire
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an interest, and has neither the ownership of nor any
interest in the property itself."
The court also referred to the annotation at 61 ALR 1454 and
found additional cases on both sides of that proposition, but
distinguished one line of cases on the ground that the statutes
involved were similar to the Vermont statute, requiring that
a contract be in writing when it is for the sale of lands or
for "an interest in or concerning them" and held that since
the Vermont statute was like those others and since an option
appeared to be a contract concerning lands, it would have to
be in writing in Vermont.
Williston on Contracts, Section 491, page 1416, finds the
authorities to be divided on this question. The text says:
"In regard to an oral option given by an owner of
land, Montana and Oregon hold that an option creates
no interest in land until it is accepted and a binding
contract is formed, while a number of states hold an
interest in land is immediately created and require the
option to be in writing."
It is interesting to note that the 1956 Cumulative Supplement gives an instruction to change this sentence to read as
follows:
"In regard to an option given by an owner of land,
some states hold that an option creates no interest in
land until it is accepted and a binding contract is
formed, while others hold an interest in land is immediately created and requires an assignment of rights
under the option to be in writing", citing one additional
case for the last proposition.

This seems to change the holding that an option is not an
interest in land from a two state rule to the preferred view,
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and at least indicates that in the opinion of the author that
view became stronger between the time of the text and the
time of the supplement. The one case cited, Harper vs. Pauley,
West Virginia 1953, 81 S. E. 2d 728, is of no assistance. In
that case there was a written option which was finally held
to be insufficient as to the description of land and in a suit
for specific performance it was held that the description was
insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, but without any
apparent consideration of whether the option created an interest
in land.

If an option is not an interest in land, it follows that
employment to obtain an option is not employment to purchase
real estate and need not be in writing under the statute of
frauds.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The agreement between appellant and respondent was
that respondent would pay for appellant's services in packaging
or putting together some large tracts of land in Salt Lake
County for respondent's consideration, but if any were pur·
chased, appellant would look to the sellers for his compensation. This was not employment for the purchaser of real estate
for compensation. Appellant had no authority to bind respondent, had no money from respondent and was unable
to obtain anything more than offers to sell for respondent's
consideration. The word "option, was used but appellant was
not empowered to obtain a valid option and obtained none.
And if he had been employed to obtain a valid option that
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would not be the obtaining of an interest in land in Utah
and would not be employment for the purchase or sale of land
for compensation.
The order dismissing the complaint should be reversed
and the district court should be directed to enter judgment
for the appellant as prayed in the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS AND BIRD
Attorneys for Appellant
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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